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Judicial Construction of the New York
Arbitration Law of 1920
LIONEL S. POPKIN*
This article is a review and analysis of the decisions of the New
York courts concerning arbitration since the enactment of the Arbi-
tration Law of 1920.'
CONTRACT NEED NOT BE ACKNOWLEDGED
Section 2 of that law provides:
"A provision in a written contract to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising between the parties to the con-
tract, or a submission hereafter entered into of an existing con-
troversy to arbitration pursuant to title eight of chapter seven-
teen of the Code of Civil Procedure, or article eighty-three of
the civil practice act, shall be valid, enforcible and irrevocable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract:"
It will be noted that there is no requirement that the contract be
acknowledged. However, section 8 of the Arbitration Law made
applicable to arbitration agreements, sections 1410 to 1431 (except
sections 1428 to i43o)-now sections 1448 to I4 69 -of the Civil
Practice Act "so far as practicable and consistent * * * and for such
purpose the arbitration agreement shall be deemed a submission to
arbitration." Section 1449 (as now numbered) requires a submission
to be "duly acknowledged or proved, and certified, in like manner
as a deed to be recorded."
Contracts between merchants or between others in the business
world are seldom acknowledged and it was those contracts primarily
which the legislature in passing the Arbitration Law wished to cover.
The Appellate Division of the First Department, accordingly recog-
nized that'it would be "impracticable" (within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8) to apply Section 1449 to contracts for arbitration and held
that such contracts need not be acknowledged.
2
*Of the New York Bar.
'New York Laws of 1920, Ch. 275, effective April i9, 1920.
2 Matter of Yeannakopoulos, I95 App. Div. 261, (1921) 186 N. Y. Supp. 457;
the court stated at page 263:
"A study of the various provisions of the Code mentioned in Section 8
of the Arbitration Law, read in connection with Section 2 of that law, clearly
shows that the provisions in Section 2366 of the Code (now Section 1449 of
the Civil Practice Act) requiring the instrument of submission to be ac-
knowledged apply exclusively to a submission, entered into between the
parties under the Code of Civil Procedure."
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THE WORDING OF ARBITRATION CLAUSE
No specific or formal language is required to cover the arbitration
of future disputes. The contract may provide simply for "arbitra-
tion under the New York Law." 3 It appears that a clause requiring
arbitration in the "usual manner" is sufficient and evidence will be
received to determine what the "usual manner" isA The arbitrator
or arbitrators need not be named in the contract.5
WHEN PROVISION FOR ARBITRATION WILL NOT BE ENFORCED
Arbitration will not be granted in all cases where the contract
provides therefor. The provision for arbitration is not self-executory
and if one party refuses to proceed with the arbitration, the other
cannot do so without court order. 6
ExPREss LIMITATIONS UNDER THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT
Under the Civil Practice Act (Section 1448) arbitration is not per-
mitted in the following cases:
(i) Where either party is an infant, or a person incompetent
to manage his affairs by reason of lunacy, idiocy or habitual
drunkenness.
And at page 264:
"It is decidedly 'impracticable' to expect written contracts between
merchants to be 'duly acknowledged' and it is not likely that the legislature
contemplated that the provisions of Section 2366 of the Code should have
been intended to apply to such an arbitration."3Matter of Gerseta Corp. 2oo App. Div. 89o, (1922) 192 N. Y. Supp. 370,
appeal dismissed 233 N. Y. 544. See cases and discussion infra, footnote 17.
Kelvin Engineering Co. v. Blanco, 21o N. Y. Supp. 10 (1925).4See Matter of Palmer & Pierce, 195 App. Div. 523, 186 N. Y. Supp. 369
(192r) where the contract provided: "any dispute arising as to the quality or de-
livery on this contract to be arbitrated in the usual manner." The court held
that a jury trial should have been ordered to determine, among other things,
whether the arbitration agreed upon was one to be conducted by the board of
arbitration of the Dried Fruit Assn. of New York or pursuant to the laws of this
State, it appearing from the affidavit in answer to the petition that that asso-
ciation was generally resorted to by food merchants in the city of New York.
GSection 4 of the Arbitration Act provides that
"If no method (for appointing the arbitrator)be provided therein (in the con-
tract) *** then, upon application by either party to the controversy, the
Supreme Court, or a judge thereof shall designate and appoint an arbitrator
or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act under the said
contract or submission with the same force and effect as if he or they had
been specifically named therein; and unless otherwise provided, the arbitra-
tion shall be by a single arbitrator."
GSections 3 and 4 of the Arbitration Law. Nor can one party proceed with the
arbitration when the other party and the arbitrator selected by him have with-
drawn after the appointment of arbitrators but before evidence is taken. Bullard
v. Grace Co., 240 N. Y. 388, 148 N. E. 559, (1925) aff'g 2io App. Div. 476 where
the Court of Appeals stated:
'Repudiation by one party of the contract to arbitrate does not, therefore,
leave the other party in position to proceed without the sanction of the court.
The withdrawing party might still assert that it had made no contract to sub-
mit to arbitration the questions contained in the submission, that it was not
in default under the contract."
JUDICIAL ARBITRATION
(2) Where the controversy arises respecting a claim to an
estate in real property, in fee or for life (with certain excep-
tions).
JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER LACKING
By judicial decision, arbitration has been further restricted. Thus
arbitration will be refused where the court would not have jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter if brought before it in an action.7
ARBITRATION OUTSIDE THE STATE WILL NOT BE ORDERED
Nor will the court direct parties to arbitrate before arbitrators
outside of New York State, even though they have agreed to do'so.&
Clearly where the parties are before it, the court has the power to-
so order. 8 a Moreover the court's refusal to direct arbitration outside
the state is not based on the ground that the contract to do so is
invalid; on the contrary such an agreement to arbitrate is valid and
the party who has refused to arbitrate will, it seems, be stayed from
bringing an action on the contract.9
DISPUTE MUST COME WITHIN ARBITRATION CLAUSE
Of course, the clause providing for arbitration must cover the dis-
pute which has arisen. The courts have evidenced an intention to
construe arbitration clauses strictly in that regard on the ground that
a party should not be deprived of his right to a court trial 0 unless he
Matter of Red Cross Line, 233 N. Y. 373, (1922) reversing 199 App. Div.
961. In this case the charter party contained a provision for arbitration in New
York. The dispute involved the use of a steamship and transportation of a
cargo from New York to Newfundland. The Court of Appeals held that arbi-
tration should be denied. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court
of Appeals (264 U. S. 109) on the ground that-the Court of Appeals was mis-
taken in holding that the federal constitution prohibited arbitration of maritime
disputes to become subject to the jurisdiction of state courts. The Supreme
Court, however, made it clear that the Court of Appeals could exclude such dis-
putes, as a matter of statutory construction, if it so desired. The Supreme Court
decision does not affect the general conclusion stated by the Court of Appeals,
viz: that the court will not grant arbitration where the court has not jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
sMatter of Inter Ocean Food Products Corp (New York Mercantile Co.) 2o6
App. Div. 426, 2Ol N. Y. Supp. 536, (1923) reversing 120 Misc. 840, 20o N. Y.
Supp. 775 (1923); Matter of California Packing Corp. 121 Misc. 212, 2Ol N. Y.
Supp. 158 (1923).
SaPenn. v. Lord Baltimore (1750) I Vesey Sr., 1132; 35 Har. L. Rev. 6Io.
OMatter of Inter Ocean Food Products Corp., 206 App. Div. 426, at page 433,
2o N. Y. Supp. 536, at p. 540 (1923); Kelvin Engineering Co. v. Blanco, 210
N. Y. Supp. IO (1925).
'
0Young v. Crescent, 24o N. Y. 244 (1925); Matter of Priore, 237 N. Y. 16,
aff'g 2o4 App. Div. 332, 198 N. Y. Supp. 57 (1923). In re Kelly 240 N. Y. 74
reversing 209 App. Div. 870, 205 N. Y. Supp. 931 (1924). In Matter of Priore
the court had before it upon a motion to confirm an award, the usual arbitra-
tion clause contained in the standard form of building contract whichprovided:
"In case the owner and contractor fail to agree in relation to matters of
payment, allowance or loss referred to in Arts. III or VIII of this con-
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has clearly agreed to do so. In Young and Wright etc. v. Crescent
Development Co." the contract provided:
"All questions that may arise under this contract and in the
performance of the work thereunder shall be submitted to arbi-
tration at the choice of either of the parties hereto."
A dispute arose, the contractors claiming large sums of money for
work and materials and still larger sums as damages because the owner
had delayed the contractors in the performance of the work. The
court held that the dispute was not covered by the arbitration clause
stating at page 248:
"While the question may be close and debatable, I do not
think that the arbitration clause in the contract should be in-
terpreted as covering and including such a claim as the one made
against appellant for breach of the contract. The arbitration
clause provides for the submission of 'all questions that may
arise under this contract and in the performance of the work
thereunder.' We know by common experience the class of ques-
tions to which this language naturally applies. It applies as
tract * * * then the matter shall be referred to a Board of Arbitration * * *"
The Appellate Division (page 333) interpreting the clause liberally, held that
all disputes were covered and should be submitted to arbitration. The Court of
Appeals, while affirming the order of the Appellate Division placed its decision(page i8) upon the ground that the method of procedure before the arbitrators
amounted to a waiver of the restrictions under the contract and gave the ar-
bitrators jurisdiction to determine all matters in dispute and stated at page 17
of its decision that the arbitration clause must be confined to disputes specifically
covered thereby.
In In re Kelly the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division which had
affirmed the order entered at Special Term denying a motion to compel arbitra-
tion, where a contract between partners upon the dissolution of the firm provided
that in event "of any difference or dispute of any nature whatsoever in any
manner relating to the partnership or liquidation of the partnership as between
any of the partners or as between the liquidating partners themselves" it should
be submitted to arbitration. A dispute arose as to whether an enterprise con-
ducted by the liquidating partners was an asset of the old partnership or of the
liquidating partners alone who were given the right to continue and conduct
enterprises in their own right. The Court of Appeals directed that the question
be arbitrated, but stated at page 78:
"The contract, however, must be to arbitrate the precise matter as to
which arbitration is sought. Upon this depends both the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator and the power of the court; * * * as to the merits between them (the
parties) neither we nor the courts below are concerned."
And at page 79:
"We are told that the arbitrator may not determine whether or not he has
jurisdiction. That may or may not be true. It all depends upon the language
of the agreement. The intention may be to submit that question to him.
Then he may pass upon it."
See also Matter of Siracusa 237 N. Y. 572, aff'g 2o6 App. Div. 756, 200 N. Y.
Supp. 949, (I923).
In the light of these decisions it would seem that the tendency of the courts
will be to construe the subject matter of the arbitration clause strictly and to
limit the arbitration to the "precise" questions stated therein.
i2 4 o N. Y. 244, (i925) Cardozo J. dissenting, Pound and Crane, JJ. concurred
in the decision on another ground, viz., that the appellant had waived its right to
arbitration.
JUDICIAL ARBITRATION
stated to questions arising under and in the performance of a
contract and such questions are those which involve an inter-
pretation of its provisions for the purpose of determining whether
work has been done according to the contract, whether work
which has been demanded under the contract is really covered
by its provisions or constitutes extra work, when payments
become due, and so on. All of these questions involve recog-
nition of the contract and not repudiation of it.
"This is not true of the claim under discussion. According to
respondent's theory the acts done by appellant were not done
under and in performance of the contract, but in violation of it,
and in repudiation of its provisions. There is involved no
interpretation of its meaning, but a wilful refusal to be bound
by it and, as it seems to me, this clause was intended to cover
controversies which do not deny, but seek an interpretation
of and submission to its provisions, an attitude which seeks
action under the contract and not one outside of and in denial
of it."
It is difficult to understand the court's distinction in that case.
Certainly it is questionable that the court gave due weight to the
intent of business men as evidenced in language used in a commercial
contract. A determination "whether work has been done according
to the contract, etc." necessarily involves a decision as to whether
the work has not been done according to the contract, i. e., whether
there has been a breach of the contract. So too the claims for work
and materials and for damages for delay would require the decision
of the arbitrators as to whether the contractors furnished the services
and materials in performance of the contract and whether the owner
acted in conformance with the contract in doing those things which
caused the alleged delay. Apparently it was the conjunctive "and"
together with the words "in the performance of the work" (contained
in the arbitration clause) which were the determining factor with
the court. Only four judges of the Court of Appeals placed their
decision on that ground (one dissenting and two others concurring
on the ground that the right to arbitration had been waived); the
court should and probably will confine that decision strictly to apply
to clauses of identical wording.
Even though the contract does not cover the particular dispute,
where the arbitration has proceeded and embraced questions not
included within the clause, and the arbitrators have made their
award, the parties are held to have given the arbitrators jurisdiction
by failure to object.n
'
2Matter of Priore, 237 N. Y. i6 (1923) at page i8: "In other words, the
method of procedure before the arbitration amounted to a waiver of the re-
strictions under the contract and gave the arbitrators jurisdiction to determine
all matters in dispute."
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Of course, arbitration will not be ordered where the disputed
question has become academic and moot.12'
APPRAISAL AND VALUATION CLAUSES ARE NOT WITHIN
ARBITRATION LAW
So-called appraisal and valuation clauses, which appear most
commonly in contracts of insurance, are not provisions for arbitra-
tion. Those clauses generally provide that in the event of loss or
damage appraisers shall be appointed in an agreed manner and their
decision as to the amount of loss or damage shall be binding. It had
been held before the Arbitration Law went into effect that such a
provision was not an agreement to arbitrate but was merely a method
of fixing an amount similar to an agreement to have accountants
examine accounts and strike a balance.1 3 The decisions since the
arbitration act went into effect hold that the Arbitration Law did
not increase the scope of such appraisal clauses, and that they do not
constitute provisions for arbitration.14
UaMaller of Checker Cab Corp. v. Heller 241 N. Y. 148 (1923). In this case,
the arbitration was limited by the contract to the question whether there was a
relation of the contract by one party for which the other party could rescind
arbitration was requested after the contract by its terms expired. The Court of
Appeals, in an opinion by Pound, J. held that since the contract had expired, a
decision of the arbitrators upon which to base a rescission would be the deter-
mination of a moot question and refused arbitration.13Wurster v. Armfield, 175 N. Y. 256, 259 (1903); Strome v. London Corp.
20 App. Div., 571, 572, 47 N. Y. Supp. 481, aff'd 162 N. Y. 627 (1897); Toledo
S. S. Co. v. Zenith Co. 184 Fed. 391 (1911).
"Matter of Fletcher, 237 N. Y. 44o, reversing 206 App. Div. 778, 200 N. Y.
Supp. 922 (1923); Matter of American Ins. Co. 208 App. Div. 168 (1924); Williams
v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co. 118 Misc. 799, 194 N. Y. Supp. 798 (1922). See 8
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 53; 34 Yale L. J. 98, IO9.
In Matter of Fletcher, supra, there was a provision in the contract as follows:
"The said fair value * * * shall be determined by an ap praisal thereof made by
three arbitrators, one to be appointed by Mr. Fletcher * *, another to be ap-
pointed by Mr. Nicholas ** * and a third to be appointed by the other two."
The Appellate Division of the Second Department held that this clause consti-
tuted a provision for arbitration and ordered the appointment of an arbitrator.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, and stated at pages
447-448:
"Since the legislature has expressly confined the application of the Arbi-
tration Law to contracts 'to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
-arising between the parties' and has conferred upon the arbitrators powers
appropriate only to the decision of matters otherwise cognizable by the courts,
it seems to us that it was the plain intent of the legislature not to include
mere valuations, appraisals or other determination of matters which except
for the provisions of the contract would be settled not by the courts after a
judicial inquiry but by the parties themselves without such inquiry. The
present contract is not one to settle a controversy between the parties but
is one to avoid a possible controversy by leaving the settlement of a ques-
tion to third parties; the third parties are not expected to settle the matter
in a quasi-judicial manner and it seems to us that it, therefore, does not
come within the letter or spirit of the statute."
The court went on to say that if the appraisal were not made, because of
either party's default, the other party could bring his action, setting forth the
failure of the appraisal, and the court would fix the value.
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STAY Or TRIAL WILL BE GRANTED WHERE ONE PARTY
HAS REFUSED TO ARBITRATE
One of the most important sections of the Arbitration Law is
that providing for a stay against the defaulting party, of the trial in
any suit or proceeding involving a dispute otherwise referrable to
arbitration.15 While there have been no decisions so holding, it
would seem certain that a party who has refused to arbitrate when
called upon to do so cannot procure a stay of the trial in an action
subsequently brought by the other party upon the contract, even
though. the latter has not asked the court to compel arbitration. It
is not believed that the courts will compel a party (as a precautionary
measure, lest he be met in an action with a motion for a stay) to
move for an order directing arbitration rather than bring an ac-
tion, if he chooses, against the party who has refused to arbitrate
In Matter of American Ins. Co., supra, the Special Term granted an order for
arbitration upon motion of the insurance company. The Appellate Division
reversed the order of the Special Term. The clause was the usual one contained in
the standard form of New York fire insurance policy, reading:
"In case the insured and this company shall fail to agree as to the amount
of loss or damage, each shall, on the written demand of either, select a com-
petent and disinterested appraiser. The appraiser shall first select a compe-
tent and disinterested umpire. * * * The appraisers shall then appraise
the loss and damage stating separately sound value and loss or damage to
each item. * * * An award in writing, so itemized, of any two when filed
with this company shall determine the amount of sound value and loss or
damage."
The Appellate Division held that this was not a clause for arbitration, stating
at page r7o:
"A distinction, however, has invariably been observed between the refer-
ence of a collateral or incidental matter of appraisement or calculation, the
decision of which is not conclusive as to the ultimate rights of the parties,
except the mere matter of amount due, and the submission of all the matters
that are in controversy between the parties for final determination upon
the whole issue. The distinction has been preserved because the submission
of a collateral fact or of a particular question, without making the whole con-
troversy the subject of the determination of arbitrators, is not deemed a
coercive means designed to put an end to the controversy between the con-
tentious parties."
And at page 171 the court added:
"The Arbitration Law itself does not extend the hitherto recognized type
of arbitration so as to include within its embracement appraisals of inci-
dental matters which are at times provided for in contracts, and since, prior
to the adoption of the Arbitration Law, appraisals of the character pro-
vided for in insurance policies were never considered as arbitrations and
were had quite informally without the procedure of oaths, witnesses, notices
of trial and formal awards, there is no reason indicated for a change there-
under."15Section 5 reads:
"If any suit or proceeding be brought upon any issue otherwise referrable
to arbitration under a contract or submission described in section two, the
Supreme Court, or a judge thereof, upon being satisfied that the issue in-
volved in such suit or proceeding is referrable to arbitration under a con-
tract containing a provision for arbitration or under a submission described
in section two, shall stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement."
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when called upon to do so. In those cases where the courts will not
direct a party to arbitrate because the contract requires the arbitra-
tion to take place in another jurisdiction,18 the court will nevertheless
stay the trial of an action brought in this state upon the contract
by the party who has refused to arbitrate.'7
RIGHT TO STAY MAY BE WAIVED
One of the parties by his conduct may waive his right to arbitra-
tion and to a stay of the trial in an action at law upon the contract.
'
8Supra, n. 8.
17See Matter of Interocean Co. 206 App. Div. 426, at 433, 2oi N. Y. Supp.
536, at 540 (1923) Kelvin v. Blanco, 210 N. Y. Supp. i0 (1925).
Very often the courts are confronted with clauses in contracts vesting juris-
diction solely in the courts of some other state or country. In Kelvin v. Blanco,
supra, the contract provided:
"The parties hereto submit themselves to the courts of the City of San-
tiago de Cuba (where the contract was made) for all questions relating to
performance or non-performance of this contract, expressly renouncing
their right to litigate in any other place."
The Special Term Justice held this was a provision for arbitration and granted
a stay.
In Sliosberg v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. 211 N. Y. Supp. 270 (1925) the contract
stated:
"Any claims or suits that may arise on the present insurance are acknowl-
edged by both parties as being subject to the jurisdiction of the St. Petersburg
courts only."
A motion to stay the action was made but denied without prejudice. While
the court's attitude is not clearly expressed, he apparently believed that the
clause in question was not a provision for arbitration.
Such clauses are not arbitration agreements. They are merely agreements to
litigate in a particular jurisdiction. The learned Justice who rendered the de-
cision in Kelvin v. Blanco was right in his conclusion, but was in error, it is
submitted, in holding that the clause was an arbitration agreement.
In Sudbury v. Ambie Verwaltung Inc. 213 App. Div. 98 (1925) the Appellate
Division, First Department, held that a clause in a contract between a citizen
of New York (plaintiff) and the defendant (a German corporation) providing
that "for the decision of such disputes, exclusive jurisdiction is rested in German
courts" was against public policy, null and void. The court indicated (page I69)
that its decision would apply only where one of the parties is a resident of this
state. The defendant's motion in this case was to dismiss the complaint, but it
is evident that the holding would have been the same had defendant moved for a
stay. It is submitted that this decision is inconsistent with this court's prior
holdings and not in keeping with the intent of the arbitration Law.
The arbitration Law changed the public policy of the state so as to permit
parties to a contract, whether residents or non-residents, to oust the court of
jurisdiction. The Appellate Division of the First Department in granting in a
prior action, a stay where the arbitration was to be before arbitrators in a foreign
jurisdiction (see cases cited supra footnote 8) held that it was not against public
policy to oust the courts of jurisdiction in favor of a foreign arbitrator. Had the
court placed in the Sudbury case its decision on the ground that the clause was not
a provision for arbitration within the meaning of the Arbitration Law there would
be a logical basis for its conclusion. However, it is difficult to comprehend how
public policy forbids the submission to foreign courts but allows submission to
foreign individuals. The English courts have construed the power as arbitration
agreements. Austrian Lloyd Steamship Co. v. Gresham Life Assurance Soc.
[19o3] I K. B. 249; The Cap. Blanco (1913) io9 L. T. R. 672; see 25 Columbia
Law Review io66.
JUDICIAL ARBITRATION
In Matter of Zimmerman v. Cohen18 the plaintiff sued at law; defendant
answered, served a notice of trial, moved for a commission and took
testimony by deposition. Shortly before the trial the defendant
moved for an order directing arbitration. The Court of Appeals
held that the right to arbitration had been waived. In Matter of
Bauer Co.19 the Appellate Division of the First Department held
that defendant had waived the right to arbitration where the facts
were as follows: The action was for breach of contract; defendant
served an amended answer without asking for arbitration or request-
ing a stay, and then noticed the case for trial. Plaintiff upon the
trial found it necessary to amend the complaint and the court granted
permission to do so, a juror being withdrawn. Plaintiff then served
an amended complaint, substantially the same as the original com-
plaint. Defendant instead of answering the amended complaint
moved for arbitration. The court at Special Term granted the mo-
tion, but the Appellate Division reversed the lower court's order
and refused arbitration.
In Hilti Co. Inc. v. Bischoff20 the plaintiff sued at law; defendant
served his answer containing a counterclaim (meanwhile, as appears
from the printed papers on appeal, having signed a stipulation extend-
ing his time to answer); the case was noticed for trial by plaintiff
18236 N. Y. 15 reversing 204 App. Div. 375; 198 N. Y. Supp. 139 (1923); the
Appellate Division certified the following question to the Court of Appeals:
"Is the right to proceed with an arbitration provided for by agreement absolutedown to the time of trial?" The Court of Appeals answered "No," and held that
defendant had waived the right to arbitrate. The Court of Appeals also stated
that plaintiff had waived the right to arbitrate by suing at law.19Matter of Bauer Co. 206 App. Div. 423, 201 N. Y. Supp. 438 (1923); the
court stated at page 46,
"I am of the opinion that petitioner, by its course of conduct and long
silence, had waived its right to arbitrate and elected to have the controversy
adjudicated by the courts, and that, therefore, the order requiring arbitra-
tion should be reversed *** and the motion denied."
See also Samuels v. Samis, 124 Misc. 35, 207 N. Y. Supp. 249 (1925).
202o5 App. Div. 856, i9& N. Y. Supp. 915 (923) reversing H9 Misc. 572,
197 N. Y. Supp. 617 (1922); Lewis J., at Special Term in denying the motion,
stated at page 573:
"One of the objects of the Arbitration Law undoubtedly was to prevent
and not to encourage delay. The defendant by the service of his answer and
the assertion of his counterclaim has waived his right to arbitration under the
agreement and has elected the tribunal and the method by which the action
may be tried.'"
The Appellate Division in a memorandum opinion concurred in by all the
justices, held:
"Applied to the present case, there could be no waiver of arbitration before
trial by the interposition of an answer. (Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib &
Houlberg, 230 N. Y. 273 (1921).
The case cited by the court is not an authority in point. The Appellate Di-
vision lays down a rule that is not fair to the plaintiff, who after waiting perhaps
one or two years for his case to be reached for trial is suddenly confronted with
the defendant's motion for a stay.
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and appeared on the calendar. Defendant then moved for arbitra-
tion. The Special Term Justice denied the motion but on appeal the
order was reversed and the motion granted.
The Hilti case may be distinguished from the Zimmerman case and
Matter of Bauer on the ground that in the two last named cases, the
defendant had done some affirmative act other than to serve his
answer (in the Zimmerman case, defendant served a notice of trial
and took testimony by deposition; in Matter of Bauer, defendant
served a notice of trial; in the Hiltil case defendant had merely served
his answer containing a counterclaim).
In In re Young and Wright v. Crescent Development Co." the peti-
tioners' motion for arbitration was returnable October 2, 1924. On
July io or July i, 1924, the petitioners had filed in the County
Clerk's office and served upon the owner pursuant to the Lien Law,
copies of notices of mechanics liens covering in the aggregate the
amount claimed for work and materials, petitioners also having a
claim for damages for delay caused by the owner. On October 17,
1924, the owner served notice pursuant to Sec. 59 of the Lien Law
requiring petitioners to commence action within thirty days for the
enforcement of the lien. The Court of Appeals held that petitioners
had waived their right to arbitration and that by filing the liens,
which were not merely security but a method of enforcing the claim
they had evidenced a clear intent to elect that remedy.
The English Arbitration Act of i899 specifically requires the de-
fendant in an action to move for arbitration or for a stay, after appear-
ance but before pleading or taking any other steps in the action.2
Our Arbitration Law has no such requirement and the Court of
Appeals has stated that the defendant may serve his answer contain-
ing a counterclaim for arbitration without waiving his rights under
the Arbitration Law.23
2 Young v. Crescent 24o N. Y. 244 (1925). The Court of Appeals stated
at pp. 248-249:
"But passing this, we come to the second and more important question
which has been outlined, and I think that the answer to that question must be
that the respondents by filing mechanics liens set out on a course so incon-
sistent with arbitration that they must be regarded as having decisively
elected to waive and abandon their right to that course. We are all agreed
that if respondents by filing these liens abandoned their right to arbitration of
the claims covered thereby, such waiver would also bar their right to arbitra-
tion of the claim for damages for breach of contract. We do not think that a
party having two or more claims against the same party springing out of
the same contract ought to be allowed to abandon his right to arbitration in
respect of some of these while he insists upon it in respect of others."22See Chappell v. North (1891) 2 Q. B. 252.
23Matter of Hosiery Mfrs. Corp. v. Goldston, 238 N. Y. 22 at page 27 modi-
fying 2o6 App. Div. 414, 2o N. Y. Supp. 516 (1923).
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The better rule would be to require the defendant to move for
arbitration before answering or at least to assert his right to arbitra-
tion in his answer. In that way the plaintiff would not go to the
trouble and expense of continuing the action at law, only to be con-
fronted long after with a stay of further proceedings on his part.
STEPS IN THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDING;
PROCEDURE UPON ONE PARTY'S DEFAULT
If either party refuses to appoint an arbitrator the other party
may petition the Supreme Court for an order directing arbitration
and appointing an arbitrator. Sections 3 and 4 of the Arbitration
Law prescribe in detail the method of procedure. It is worthy of
note that the petition must be served "in the manner provided by
law for personal service of a summons" viz., by service upon the
defendant within the state. Substituted service upon a resident
defendant or service by publication upon a non-resident defendant
is therefore not permitted, so that if the defendant absents himself
from the state the petitioner is helpless to proceed.
If the making of the contract or the default is in issue the question
is tried by the court or by a jury if demanded.24 Where the authority
of the agent who signed the contract on behalf of the party against
whom arbitration is sought, is questioned the court or jury must
pass upon that point before arbitration will be directed.u
After the arbitrators are appointed they must give notice to each
party of the time and place of the hearing, which they may adjourn
from time to time; they are required to take an oath before proceed-
ing to hear testimony, and all must meet together. The award must
be in writing and subscribed and acknowledged by the arbitrators;
it should be filed in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court or
delivered to one of the parties. A motion to confirm the award must
be made upon notice within one year after the award is made. Judg-
ment is entered upon the award, and such judgment has the same
force and may be appealed from in like manner as a judgment in an
action.2
Where the arbitrator or arbitrators are named in the contract,
they can proceed With the arbitration without court order when the
2 Sec. 3 of the Arbitration Law; Matter of Gresham, 202 App. Div. 211, 195
N. Y. Supp. io6 (1922); Matter of Palmer & Pierce 195 App. Div. 523; 186 N. Y.
Supp. 369 (1921); Matter of Siracusa 237 N. Y. 572, aff'g. 2o6 App. Div. 756,
20o N. Y. Supp. 949 (1923).25Matter of Gresham 202 App. Div. 211, 195 N. Y. Supp. io6 (1922). Matter
of Palmer & Pierce, 195 App. Div. 523, 186 N. Y. Supp. 369 (1922).
.
0See Sections 1451-1464 of the Civil Practice Act Vith reference to these
and similar questions of procedure, etc.
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controversy is presented to them by either party, upon giving notice
to both parties. This point of procedure is not covered in the Arbi-
tration Law nor in the Civil Practice Act and there have been no de-
cisions upon it. But it does not seem open to question. There would
seem to be no good reason to require a court order until one of the
parties questions the making of the contract or raises a jurisdictional
question. However, the arbitrators cannot proceed without court
order, where one party and the arbitrator appointed by him with-
draw from the hearings before testimony is taken. This question
was squarely presented to the Court of Appeals in Bullard v. Grace
Co.2 7 In that case the parties had submitted to arbitrators the
question, "whether or not * * * the cases of butter are a good delivery
per terms of said contract." Arbitrators were selected and hearings
commenced. At the first hearing the buyer claimed that the quality
of the butter was open to decision by the arbitrators even though
the contract provided that the certificate of the Argentine govern-
ment should be final as to quality and such certificates had been
issued by the Argentine government attesting that the quality of
the butter was in accordance with the contract. The chairman of
the arbitrators ruled that the quality of the butter was open to the
arbitrators, and thereupon the seller's representatives and one of the
arbitrators withdrew. The two remaining arbitrators proceeded
and made their award which was confirmed and judgment was entered
thereon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate
Division, which set aside the award and vacated the judgment.28
27Bullard v. Grace Co. 240 N. Y. 388, 148 N. E. 559 (1925), aff'g. 210 App.
Div. 476.
28S. 1453 of the Civil Practice Act provides in part:
"All the arbitrators selected as prescribed in this article must meet to-
gether and hear all the allegations and proofs of the parties; but an award
by a majority of them is valid unless the concurrence of all is expressly re-
quired in the submission."
The Court of Appeals in Bullard v. Grace Co. supra n. 27, stated at pages
393-394:
"When an arbitrator withdraws before the allegations and proofs of the
parties have been heard, the filling of the vacancy by appointment of a sub-
stitute arbitrator either under the terms of the contract or under the Arbi-
tration Law (Sections 3, 4) becomes a prerequisite to further proceedings
under the submission (Bulson v. Lohnes 29 N. Y. 291). The purposeofthe
statute was to change the common-law rule which permitted two arbitrators
to hear when the third was notified and refused to attend or was wilfully
absent (Crofoot v. Allen, 2 Wend. 494) and its plain mandate may not be
ignored, whether an arbitrator at this stage of the proceedings withdraws for
good cause or arbitrarily (see, however, Matter of Am. Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v.
N. J. Ins. Co. 24o N. Y. 398 (1925) decided herewith)."
The Court of Appeals continued at page 396:
"Repudiation by one party of the contract to arbitrate does not, therefore,
leave the other party in position to proceed without the sanction of the court.
The withdrawing party might still assert that it had made no contract to
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If a party and an arbitrator may withdraw before testimony is
presented to the arbitrators, upon the ground that the arbitrators
have not jurisdiction of the question presented, it would seem that
they could do so at a later stage of the proceedings when the matter
arises, and the remaining arbitrators would be powerless to act with-
out court order. The same conclusion must logically be drawn where
one party withdraws, but all the arbitrators continue. To require a
court order in each of such instances would disturb the proceeding
and perhaps render orderly conduct thereof difficult. The better
rule would be to permit the party who deems himself injured to note
his objection on the record or to present his objection in written form
if no record is being made and to leave all questions for the court
upon the motion to confirm the award; when that motion is made
the party who upon the arbitration disputed the jurisdiction of the
arbitrators upon a particular question or raised any other objection
could then have the court review his objections. Certainly the courts
should limit the decision in Bullard v. Grace Co. to cases where the
party and an arbitrator withdraw before evidence is presented; other-
wise if one of the parties wishes to be technical he can delay the arbi-
tration indefinitely by withdrawing with the arbitrator appointed
by him (who is generally friendly to him) for the slightest reason and
thereby compel the other party to petition the court for an order
upon each of such withdrawals. 28
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS Or ASSIGNEE AND RECEIVER UNDER
CONTRACT FOR ARBITRATION
The Court of Appeals has held that the receiver of one of the
parties is entitled to an order directing the other party to arbitrate,2
submit to arbitration the questions contained in the submission; that it was
not in default under the contract."
It is difficult to understand how the withdrawing party could contend that it
had not entered into the submission or that it was not in default, after entering
into the submission, and appointing the arbitrator; the submission unlike a con-
tract to arbitrate future disputes, assumes the existence of a controversy.
28aThe House of Lords reversing the Court of Appeals has just held that where
the arbitration clause provides that "in default of either party appointing any
arbitrator within one month of the other party requesting it to do so, the latter
shall name both arbitrators and they shall select an umpire" and make an award,
the award thus made by arbitrators selected by one party on the other's default is
invalid. The House of Lords held that the Court of Appeals of the State of New
York had indicated in Bullard v. Grace (supra n. 27) that where one party re-
fuses to select an arbitrator a court order must be procured pursuant to Section 3
of the New York Arbitration Law before proceeding.
See Liverpool Maine Ins. Co. v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. of N. Y., 24
Lloyd's List Law Reports, Feb. I8, 1926, Vol.24, No. 3, P. 85; N. Y. Law Jour.
March 4, 1926.
29Matter of Lowenthal 233 N. Y. 621, aff'g 199 App. Div. 39, 191 N. Y. Supp.
282 (1922) where the following question was certified to the Court of Appeals:
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and that the assignee of a contract containing a provision for arbitra-
tion is bound thereby and may be compelled to arbitrate.30
THE ARBITRATORS
A summary of the procedure before the arbitrators has already
been given and the reader is referred for greater details to the pro-
visions of the Civil Practice Act for guidance with respect to the
course to be pursued by the arbitrators and the parties upon the
arbitration.31
ARBITRATORS NOT BOUND BY LAW UNLESS CONTRACT SO
PROVIDES
It was settled law long before the Arbitration Act went into effect,
that arbitration awards will not be set aside because of errors of
law unless the contract provides that the arbitrators shall be bound
to follow the law.32 This rule has been restated by our courts since
the passage of the Arbitration Law and is now well established.3
Thus the arbitrators are not bound by the rule against hearsay evi-
dence, their award will not be disturbed for error of fact not appearing
on the face of the award and the court will not review any of their
findings of fact or conclusions of law. 4
"Is the receiver of one of the parties to a contract entitled to an order
directing that arbitration proceed between said party, through such re-
ceiver, and the other party to said contract, in accordance with the terms
thereof, which provided for arbitration."
The Court of Appeals answered "yes" to this question. The Appellate Di-
vision stated at page 44:
"It seems to us that, where a contract is assignable the arbitration clause is
an integral part thereof, and may be availed by of either party to the con-
tract or by his legal representatives or assigns. * * * * Such an arbitration
agreement (to arbitrate future controversies) should not be confused with
an arbitration entered into after a dispute * * * has arisen between the
parties. In such a case it might perhaps be argued that it is purely a per-
sonal agreement to settle existing differences."
30Matter of Hosiery Mfrs. Corp. v. Goldston 238 N. Y. 22 (1924), modifying
206 App. Div. 414, 2O N. Y. Supp. 516.
The Court of Appeals stated at page 28:
"Arbitration contracts would be of no value if either party thereto could
escape the effect of such a clause (for arbitration) by assigning a claim sub-ject to arbitration between the original parties to a third party. (Matter of
Lowenthal i99 App. Div. 39, x91 N. Y. Supp. 282, aff'd. 233 N. Y. 621.)"
sSections 1451-1464 of the Civil Practice Act.22Fudickar v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. 62 N. Y. 3 92 (1875), Halstead v. Seaman,82 N. Y. 27 (288o); Masuryv. Whiton III N. Y. 679 (1888).33Itoh & Co. Ltd v. Boyer Oil C. 298 App. Div. 881, 192 N. Y. Supp. 290
(1921) Matter of Goff & Sons Inc., and Rheinauer i99 App. Div. 617, 192 N. Y.
Supp. 92 (1922); Matter of Wheat Export Co. I85 App. Div. 73, 272 N. Y. Supp.
722, aff'd 227 N. Y. 595, (i919); Everett v. Brown, 120 Misc. 349 (1923); Matter
of Anderson Trading Co. Ltd. v. Brimberg 119 Misc. 784 (1922).3Un Itoh Ltd. v. Boyer Oil Co., 198 App. Div. 881, 191 N. Y. Supp. 290, (1921)
the court stated at pp. 883-884:
"The proofs in the case amply justify the award of the arbitrator, but
aside from that, the courts have uniformly held that any finding of fact or
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However, the arbitrators are bound by special provisions of the
contract. Thus in Bullard v. Grace Co.35 where the contract provided
that the certificate of the Argentine government should be final as
to quality, etc. of the butter, which was the subject of the contract,
and such certificates were issued, it was held that the question of the
quality of the butter was not open to decision by the arbitrators, the
Appellate Division stating at page 479 of its opinion:
"On the merits, it seems quite apparent that under the con-
tract in question the dispute between the parties arising out
of the contract cannot be concerned with any question of the
quality of the commodity in view of the inspection certificates
of the Argentine government which were contracted to be final
as to quality, weight and grade."
ARBITRATORS' POWER TO COMPEL ATTENDANCE
OF WITNESSES
Under Section 1453 of the Civil Practice Act the arbitrators are
specifically empowered to "require any person to attend before them
as a witness."
ARBITRATORS' FEES
Section 1454 of the Civil Practice Act provides as follows:
"Unless it is otherwise expressly provided in the submission,
the award may require the payment, by either party, of the ar-
bitrators' fees, not exceeding the fees allowed to a like number of
referees in the Supreme Court, and also their expenses."
Where the arbitrators award themselves more than is permitted
under the law the award is not thereby invalidated, but may be
modified. 6 The parties may stipulate for payment to the arbitrator
of greater compensation than the statutory fees, but the arbitrator is
not entitled under such a stipulation to compensation for legal re-
conclusion of law of an arbitrator will not be reviewed. 'The courts of this
state have adhered with great steadiness to the general rule that awards will
not be opened for errors of law or fact on the part of the arbitrator.' (Fudic-
kar v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. 62 N. Y. 392) 'The merits of an award, how-
ever unreasonable or unjust it may be, cannot be reinvestigated, for other-
wise the award, instead of being the end of the litigation, would simply be a
useless step in its progress.' (Sweet v. Morrison 116 N. Y. i9) (1889)."
In Matter of Goff & Sons Inc. and Rheinauer, 199 App. Div. 617, 192 N. Y.
Supp. 92 (1921) the court stated at page 621:
"But the very purpose of an arbitration is to insure a speedy and con-
clusive determination of the disputes between parties; and in the absence of
fraud, corruption or misconduct of the arbitrators, or for the reasons set
forth in Section 2374 of the Code of Civil Procedure, their finding will not be
disturbed."
152io App. Div. 476, 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 335, Aff'd. 240 N. Y. 388, 148 N. E.
(1925).
'"Matter of Blailde, 119 Misc. 791, 198 N. Y. Supp. 291, aff'd 2o6 App. Div.
740, i99 N. Y. Supp. 9II (1922).
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search where he was not bound by the contract to follow the law, and
that rule applies even though the arbitrator be a lawyer, and counsel
for both sides appear and submit briefs upon the law.37
ARBITRATORS' OATH
Section 1452 of the Civil Practice Act requires that,
"Before hearing any testimony, arbitrators selected either as
prescribed in this article or otherwise must be sworn by an officer
(authorized by law to administer an oath), faithfully and fairly
to hear and examine the matters in controversy and to make a
just award according to the best of their understanding, unless
the oath is waived by the written consent of the parties to the
submission or their attorneys."
It will be noted that the arbitrators "must" be sworn and there is
only one exception, i. e., when the oath is waived "by the written
consent of the parties * * * or their attorneys."
In Krauter v. Pacific Trading Corp. of America Inc.38 the oath was
not taken in the proceeding by the arbitrators but a general oath
had been taken by them pursuant to the by-laws of the New York
Produce Exchange, of which they were members. Defendant did
not raise the objection that the arbitrators had not taken the oath
until after the award had been confirmed and judgment entered,
when a motion was made to vacate and annul the judgment and
award. The Appellate Division held at page 676:
"While the objection (that the oath was not taken by the ar-
bitrators) would have been fatal to the proceeding if made at
any time before judgment, such objection cannot be urged in
an action or other proceeding to vacate or remove the judgment."
The court went on to say that the oath of office pursuant to the by-
laws of the New York Produce Exchange met the requirements of
the Practice Act.
In Cohen Iron. Works v. Jaffe"9 the Appellate Division affirmed the
order of the lower court on the opinion of the Special Term Justice
who stated in part (pages 310-311):
"Where it appears that there has been no oath andnoproper
waiver the objection if taken before judgment is fatal. ***
Moreover, I am inclined to the view that the parties properly
waived the necessity of an oath being taken by the arbitrators.
In the arbitration agreement, which was signed by both par-
ties, they agree 'to waive any provisions as to form, and do
hereby further agree that a memorandiun in writing, signed bya
37Matter of Morris (Grassi et al) N. Y. L. Jour. Apr. 3, 1925. Special Tenn.
Part I, N. Y. Co., per Mullan J.38194 App. Div. 672, 186 N. Y. Supp. io9 (192i).
19I98 App. Div. 309 (1921).
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majority of the board of arbitrators, shall be accepted as a de-
cision duly made pursuant to the Arbitration Law.' The waiver
of all provisions as to form may not be sufficient to dispense with
the taking of an oath, but the further agreement that a written
memorandum, signed by a majority of the arbitrators, shall be
deemed a decision 'duly made' may well be interpreted as con-
stituting a waiver of the necessity of an oath being adminis-
tered."
These decisions holding that the arbitrators' failure to take the
oath may be waived if not objected to before judgment obviously
constitute a judicial modification of the mandatory language used in
Section 1452. But there should be no quarrel with those decisions
since the objection is a technical one. However, the sounder rule
would be to require the objection that no oath was taken to be raised
before the award is made (not before judgment is entered) for the
reason that with the making of the award the jurisdiction of the arbi-
trators ceases and they cannot then take the oath and proceed de
iovo. 39 a
To judge from these decisions the tendency of the courts will be
to find a waiver of the technical requirements of the Practice Act
wherever possible, and to uphold the award despite harmless pro-_
cedural defects.
ARBITRATORS NOT RE(UIRED IN ALL CASES TO HAVE TESTIMONY
TAKEN DOWN STENOGRAPHICALLY
In Matter of Andersen Trading Ltd. v. Brimberg0 this question was
raised by the losing party upon a motion by the prevailing party to
confirm the award. The Special Term Justice held that while in
some cases the refusal of the arbitrators to make a record of the hear-
ings might be construed as misconduct, yet in a case such as the one
at bar, where the party desired the record to review rulings upon
testimony and points of law, there was no basis for a record as those
questions are not reviewable. The court stated at page 784:
"The defendant also complains because the arbitrator failed
and refused to have the testimony taken down by a stenographer
and transcribed. There is no rule, however, which requires
this practice in arbitrations. Morse ArB. 536. While a refusal
to permit a record to be made might in some cases be evidence
of misconduct, prejudice or failure to perform honestly the
duties of an arbitrator, no attack is made in this case upon the
fairness and honesty of the arbitrator, and it appears affirmative-
39aIt should be noted that the last subdivision of section 1457 of the Civil
Practice Act provides that where an award is vacated and the time to make the
award has not expired, the court in its discretion may direct a rehearing.
410x9 Misc. 784.
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ly that the defendant's insistence for a stenographic record was
based upon his desire to review rulings upon testimony and
points of law. But such a review, as already stated, is some-
thing he would not be- entitled to. The refusal to have the
testimony taken down by a stenographer cannot, therefore, be
deemed misbehavior by which the rights of a party have been
prejudiced. Civ. Prac. Act. Sec. 1457. Motion to confirm award
granted. Motion to reject denied."
PARTIES NOT ENTITLED AS MATTER OF RIGHT TO
COUNSEL UPON HEARINGS
This was expressly decided at Special Term in M1atter of Kayser
(Skulnik).Y The court in that case stated that "counsel fortified
with 'that wilderness of single instances' * * * would tend rather to
confusion and protraction than prompt decision." The Courts have
further evidenced their desire that arbitration proceedings be con-
ducted in an informal manner and that the preliminary steps in an
action at law be dispensed with, by refusing to grant motions for
the examination before trial of one of the parties, for inspection of
books and records" and for a bill of particulars.
2a
ARBITRATORS MUST PASS UPON ALL MATTERS
SUBMITTED TO THEM
Section I457 Subdivision 4 of the Civil Practice Act provides that
the award may be vacated:
"Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imper-
fectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made."
4 1Wagner, J. N. Y. Law Journal, January 14, 1925. Special Term Part I, the
Court's opinion is as follows:
"The respondent declines to appear as a witness before the arbitrators
unless his counsel is permitted to be heard before such arbitrators. This
motion is made to compel the respondent to attend with his books and
records, unrepresented by counsel. This presents for the first time in the
courts of this state, so far as research has been able to enlighten me, the
question whether parties to an arbitration may have counsel represent them
as a matter of right. My view is that whether counsel may be heard or par-
ticipate in the arbitration proceedings rests entirely in the sound discretion
of the arbitrators. The very purpose of arbitration is to obtain inexpensive,
expeditious and final determinations of disputes on the merits, free from tech-
nical rules and legal formalities. As a rule arbitrators are laymen, unac-
quainted with legal principles, and procedure. The presence of counsel
fortified with 'that wilderness of single instances' and with legal maxims
and some legal anachronisms would tend rather to confusion and protrac-
tion than prompt decision. Besides if one side employs counsel a burden is
cast on the other to do likewise, with resulting added expense. To permit
participation by counsel as a matter of right would be fatal to the efficacy A
of arbitration. Motion is granted. Settle order on notice." i $42Matter of Schwartz, New York L. Jour., Dec. I7, 1925, special Term. Part I,
N.Y. Co. 11
OaSmyth v. Board of Education N. Y. Law Jour., Sept. 2, 1925. Special Term,
Part I, Kings Co.
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In Hoffman v. Greenberg Co. Inc.4" a dispute involved in an action
in the Municipal Court in which the defendant had set up a counter-
claim, was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator made an award
as follows: "I have heard the parties to said controversy and decide
that the plaintiff * * * is entitled to receive from the defendant the
sun of $457.60." Judgment was entered upon the award and defend-
ant moved to vacate the judgment upon the ground that the award
showed upon its face that the arbitrator had failed to decide the issue
submitted to him "in that he failed to make any disposition of the
counterclaim interposed by the defendant." The Appellate Term
vacated the judgment upon that ground holding at page 172:
"Clearly the award in the instant case is defective, in that it is
silent as to the counterclaim which was a part of the subject
matter submitted. Whether or not the entire 'controversy'
was passed upon by the arbitrator cannot be determined by a
recourse to the language of the award."
The award should therefore show upon its face that it embraces
all matters submitted.
AWARD NEED NOT BE SIGNED BY ALL THE ARBITRATORS
In Matter of Blaikie" the losing party moved to vacate the award
upon the ground that the award was not made and signed by all the
arbitrators. It was held, however, that as the decision of the arbi-
trators need not be unanimous an award signed by a majority of the
arbitrators is valid.
In Matter of American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. et al44 the Court of
Appeals in an opinion by Judge Pound held that where one of three
arbitrators resigned after the hearings had been concluded, the two
remaining arbitrators could make a valid award; the contract of sub-
mission provided that another arbitrator should be appointed in the
event of the resignation of the particular arbitrator. The contract
also provided that "An award by a majority of the arbitrators shall
be valid and binding." The Court of Appeals, in effect held, that
the provision for appointment of a substitute arbitrator to fill a
vacancy created by resignation, was not operative after all testimony
had been taken and the hearings concluded. Crane, J. dissented on
the ground that this was a judicial modification of the contract of
the parties.
43IO9 Misc. 170 (1919).
"19 Misc. 791, 198 N. Y. Supp. 291, aff'd. 2o6 App. Div. 74o, I99 N. Y.
Supp. 911 (1922).
44a24o N. Y. 398, (1925), 148 N. E. 562; see 25 Col. L. Rev. 1076; 35 Yale
L. Jour. xo6.
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GROUNDS FOR VACATING AwARD
Section i457 of the Civil Practice Act provides:
"Motion to vacate award. In either of the following cases,
the court specified in the submission must make an order vacat-
ing the award, upon the application of either party to the sub-
mission:
(i) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or
other undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in re-
fusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the con-
troversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imper-
fectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award
upon the subject-matter submitted was not made.
Where an award is vacated, and the time within which the
submission requires the award to be made has not expired, the
court in its discretion, may direct a rehearing by the arbitrators."
The Practice Act obviously makes no attempt to define corrup-
tion, partiality, misconduct, etc. but leaves to the courts the con-
struction and definition of those terms.
It has been held that an arbitrator who borrows money from an
interested party is disqualified and that the award made or con-
curred in by him is void.Mb
In Berizzi v. Krauss45 Cardozo J., writing for the Court of Appeals,
laid down a rule, which, though specifically limited by the
Court to the facts of the case, will have a restricting influence upon
the arbitrators by confining them to a consideration of the testimony
that has been brought to their attention in the arbitration proceeding.
In that case the arbitration was before a single arbitrator. Counsel
for both sides had examined and cross-examined the witnesses.
After the hearings were closed, the arbitrator proceeded without
notice to the parties to make an independent investigation by send-
ing his own salesman out with samples of the merchandise in dispute
and by personally making inquiries among merchants in the trade.
The award was based on the evidence obtained in this manner as
well as upon the evidence presented at the hearings. The losing party
moved to vacate the award upon the ground that the independent
investigation made by the arbitrator was misbehavior, prejudical to
44bin re Friedman, 213 N. Y. Supp. 369, reversing 123 Misc. 8G9 (1924).
4239 N. Y. 315 (1925) reversing 2o8 App. Div. 322, 2o3 N. Y. Supp. 442.
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his interests. The Special Term granted the motion, the Appellate
Division reversed the Special Term and reinstated the award, and
the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and affirmed
the order of the Special Term.46 Certainly the holding is a narrow
one. Arbitrators are generally chosen because of their familiarity
with similar disputes and often act upon information and knowledge
which they have acquired in their own business dealings. Obviously
there is no way to prevent arbitrators from acting upon information
which they have previously acquired. Moreover, arbitrators are
not bound by the facts but may disregard the facts and decide the
dispute upon so-called elementary principles of justice or equity as
they conceive them. In view of that rule and the fact that the arbi-
tration was before a single arbitrator in that case it is difficult to
understand how the rights of the losing party were prejudiced. This
case may influence the courts to a strict construction of the Arbitra-
tion Law generally, and logically will tend to place arbitrators upon
the same basis as a jury which may consider only the evidence pre-
sented to it upon the trial.46a
'
6The Court of Appeals stated, 239 N. Y. 315 (1925), at page 318:
"True, the arbitrator in this proceeding acted in good faith but mis-
behavior, though without taint of corruption or fraud, may be born of in-
discretion."
The Appellate Division, while conceding that the conduct of the arbitrator
would have been sufficient before the Arbitration Law to vacate the award, held
(208 App. Div. at page 325) that the Arbitration Law showed the intention of
the legislature to require of the arbitrators only "the elementary requirements of
honesty, full hearing and impartiality."
The Court of Appeals rejected this statement of the Appellate Division and
held (page 318):
"But the only new public policy declared by the present act is the removal
of the ban that had been laid by the decisions of the courts upon general and
executory agreements for the arbitration of future differences.
And again at page 319:
"There would be little profit in fixing a time and place of hearing, if thear-
bitrators were at liberty, when the hearing was over to gather evidence ex-
parte, and rest their award upon it."
The Court of Appeals was careful to point out at page 320 of its opinion:
"We do not mean, of course, that an award will be vitiated by investiga-
tions in the absence of the parties if directed toward facts of trifling impor-
tance or facts of such a nature as to preclude reasonable contest. This may
include views or measurements or the ascertainment of physical conditions
notorious and permanent. There may be times also when an inference will be
permissible that a trial in the proper sense has been waived, and that the
arbitrators by tacit, if not express consent, have been authorized by the
parties to proceed in their own way. (Sweet v. Morrison, 1x6 N. Y. 19; cf.
Matter of Fletcher, 237 N. Y. 440.) Such is not the case before us. What
was contemplated was a hearing. What ensued was a default."
See also
Matter of East Asiatic Co. Lim. (Gordon, Wolf, Cowen Co. Inc.) N. Y. L.
Jour. Sept. I, 1925, where Walsh, J., held at Special Term Part I, N. Y. Co.,
that an award should be vacated on two grounds: (i) That one of the arbitrators
made an independent investigation and (2) That evidence was received which
was not made known to one of the parties.4kaSee 34 Yale L. Jour. 9o5.
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WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS TO AWARD
It has already been pointed out that objections to defects in the
procedure leading up to the award may be waived by the conduct
of the parties. A party may also waive his objections to the award
itself by accepting benefits thereunder. In Matter of Friedman47 an
award was made and a check sent pursuant to the award to one of the
parties, who cashed the check but later sought to resist confirmation
of the award. The court held that the acceptance of the check, a
benefit, under the award deprived him of his right to object to con-
firmation of the award. The court cited by way of analogy the de-
cisions holding that the right of appeal is lost by a party who accepts
a benefit arising out of the judgment or order appealed from.
PROVISION IN THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE THAT ARBITRATION
SHALL BE HELD WITHIN SPECIFIED TIME
Very often contracts for arbitration of future disputes, and prac-
tically always contracts for submission of existing disputes to arbi-
tration, provide that the arbitration must be demanded or take
place, as the case may be, within a specified time. Such stipulations
are valid and binding; however, the right to sue at law is not lost
if the arbitration is not demanded or held within the required time
limit. In B. Brown Inc. v. Oliver" the contract provided:
"(The merchandise) to be prime and guaranteed to comply
with the United States Government regulations or if inferior a
full allowance to be made. The same to be settled by arbitra-
tion, such arbitration to be demanded within 28 days and held
within six weeks after the arrival of the vessel."
The parties sought to adjust their differences and failing to do so,
plaintiff sued at law for breach of warranty after the lapse of the 28
day period, neither party having demanded arbitration within that
time. Defendants contended that plaintiff had lost its right to sue
at law by failing to demand arbitration. The Appellate Division
held that plaintiff could maintain the action at law, stating (at page
654 of its opinion):
"They (defendants) contend that under the contract plain-
tiff was required to arbitrate, and having failed to demand
arbitration within twenty-eight days after the receipt of the
goods, the time to arbitrate has expired, and an action is barred.
With that view we do not agree."
47123 Misc. 809, (1924), reversed on appeal upon ground that award was void
for other reasons. Supra n. 44b.
'1212 App. Div. 65i, 209 N. Y. Supp. 470 (1925).
JUDICIAL ARBITARTION
In Matter of Smith" the provision for arbitration contained in the
standard form of architect's contract issued by the American Insti-
tute of Architects, read as follows:
"Should the party demanding arbitration fail to name an
arbitrator within ten days of his demand (for arbitration) -his
right to arbitration shall lapse."
A dispute arose and the architect demanded arbitration, but failed
to name his arbitrator in ten days. He then moved for an order
directing arbitration. The court held that the provision just quoted
was valid and binding and that by failure to name an arbitrator
within the ten day period as required, the right to arbitration was
lost, and the motion was accordingly denied.
ARBITRATION wOW A SPECIAL PROCEEDING-RIGHT TO TAKE
TESTIMONY BY DEPOSITION IN ARBITRATION PROCEEDING
Prior to May 21, 1923, when the Arbitration Law was amended by
the enactment of Section 6-a50 , an arbitration was neither a special
proceeding nor an action and consequently testimony by deposition
upon open or closed commission could not be taken in an arbitra-
tion proceeding, since under Sections 288 and 308 of the Civil Practice
Act depositions may be taken only in an action or special proceeding.51
Section 6-a made arbitrations special proceedings and therefore, testi-
mony by deposition upon open or closed commission may now be
taken in arbitration proceedings.52 The order directing the parties
to proceed to arbitrate is a final order.3
CONTRACTS FOR ARBITRATION MADE BEFORE ARBITRATION LAw
TOOK EFFECT
The Arbitration Law is applicable to contracts for arbitration
made before the Arbitration Law took effect. The contracts for
49119 Misc. 324 (1922).
5°See. 6-a provides:
"Arbitration a special proceeding. Arbitration of a controversy under a
contract or submission described in section two shall be deemed a special
proceeding, of which the court specified in the contract or agreement of sub-
mission, or if none be specified, the supreme court, shall have the like juris-
diction, for all purposes, as of a submission pursuant to article eighty-four of
the civil practice act."5 See Matter of Interocean Corp. (Hoops) 204 App. Div. 284, 197 N. Y.
Supp. 7o6, aff'd 236 N. Y. 587 (1923); Matter of Interocean Corp. (Buell) 206
App. Div. 658, 199 N. Y. Supp. 929, aff 'd. 236 N. Y. 586 (1923). These two
cases arose before the enactment of Section 6-a of the Arbitration Law.
62Matter of Interocean Mercantile Corp. 207 App. Div. 164, 2Ol N. Y. Supp.
753 (1923). The court also held that as the witnesses, whose testimony was to
be taken, were hostile, an open commission would issue to take the testimony
upon oral interrogatories. The court required the moving party to pay ex-
penses and a reasonable counsel fee to the other party.
WMatter of Hosiery Mfrs. Corp. v. Goldston 238 N. Y. 22, at page 25, modi-
fying 2o6 App. Div. 414,2oi N. Y. Supp, 516 (1924).
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arbitration were not invalid, they were simply unenforceable before
the Arbitration Law, and consequently with the enactment of that
law, the barrier was removed, and arbitration will be directed under
such contracts; nor does it matter that one of the parties has died
before the passage of the Arbitration Law.54
LAw OF FORUM GOVERNS ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
In Matter of Berkovitz55 Cardozo, J. writing for the Court of Appeals,
stated at page 270:
"The common law limitation upon the enforcement of prom-
ises to arbitrate is part of the law of remedies. Meacham v. James-
town, 211 N. Y. 346, 352; 232 Fed. 403, 405; (and other cases).
The rule to be applied is the rule of the forum. Both in this
court and elsewhere, the law has been so declared. Arbitration
is a form of procedure whereby differences may be settled. It is
not a definition of the rights and wrongs out of which differences
grow. This statute did not attach a new obligation to sales
already made. It vindicated by a new "method the obligation
then existing."
Under that decision the New York courts should direct arbitra-
tion where provided for in a contract made in a jurisdiction where
arbitration would not be directed, and should stay proceedings in
an action upon the contract without making inquiry respecting the
law concerning arbitration in the jurisdiction in which the contract
was made."
64In Matter of Scott, 234 N. Y. 539, aff'g. 200 App. Div. 599, 193 N. Y. Supp.
403 (1922) the Court of Appeals answered "yes" to the following question
which was certified to it:
"Is the Arbitration Law applicable to said arbitration agreement
made before its passage where one of the parties to such agreement has
died before the passage of such law."
In Matter of Berkovitz, 23o N. Y. 26y, reversing 193 App. Div. 423, x83 N. Y.
Supp. 304, and affirming 193 App. Div. 937, 184 N. Y. Supp. 952 (1921) the
Court of Appeals answered "yes" to the following question:
"Is the Arbitration Law applicable to contracts made prior to its enact-
ment."
However, the Court of Appeals answered "no" to the question whether a
defendant in an action brought prior to the taking effect of the arbitration law
was entitled to a stay.
6523o N. Y. 261, (1921). See also U. S. Asphalt Co. v. Trinidad Lake Co. 222
Fed. Ioo6 (1915).
"Cf. Austrian Lloyd S. S. Co. v. Gresham Life Assurance Co. (19o3) i K. B.
249.
